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IMPLEMENTION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SUFFICIENT
WATER THROUGH PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Over 1 billion people across the world lack access to potable water and more
than 2 billion are without access to sanitation. In addition, approximately 2
million deaths result from easily preventable diarrhea-related sicknesses
annually.1

1 D McDonald & G Ruiters “From Public to Private (to Public Again” in McDonald & Ruiters (Eds) Age of
Commodity (2005) 1
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INTRODUCTION

Water is critical to sustaining human life. Access to safe water is vital to ensuring
that human beings enjoy a life of dignity.

It is necessary to enjoy a healthy

environment; enjoy adequate food and the right to education.2 It may even impact on
cultural practices. It is hard for words to convey the staggering extent of South
Africa’s water crisis. Almost half of South Africa’s population is income poor3 and it
was estimated during 1997 that between 12 and 14 million people in South Africa are
without access to safe water and about 20 million people are without access to
adequate sanitation.4

Redressing these inequities, largely a legacy of apartheid, must be a priority for
the democratic state. Although access to water was considered a priority during the
democratic transition, apparent from the entrenchment of the right of access to
sufficient water in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa5 it is important to
explore exactly how this commitment has been practically implemented. It hardly
seems appropriate, in the circumstances, for the provision of access to water to be
relegated to market forces. Nevertheless, this is the trend in South Africa as well as
around the world. There has been an inclination to “reduce the role of the state and to
rely on the market to resolve problems of human welfare, often in response to
2 A Kok “Water” in South African Constitutional Law by M Chasklason et al at 56B-1; Note further that in
1996 nearly one in four schools had no access to water within walking distance
(http://www.education.gov.za/dynamic/dynamic.aspx?pageid=329&catid=10&category=Reports)
3 Van Koppen & N Jha “Redressing Racial Inequities through Water Law in SA” in Liquid Relations:
Contested Rights (2005) Rutgers Univ. by Roth, Boelens & Zwarteveen (Eds) 197
4 White Paper on a National Policy for South Africa (1997), par 2.2.3 at
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/white_papers/water1.html#Vision (last visited 15 April 2006)
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996
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conditions generated by international and national financial markets and institutions
and in an effort to attract investments from multinational enterprises whose wealth
and power exceed that of many states”. 6

Privatization of basic social services involves a shift of authority from the state,
the traditional bearer of human rights obligations, to the private sector which impacts
on the “constitutional boundaries between the state and the private sphere”.7 This
leads us question whether privatization enhances the ability to realize the right of
access to adequate water. For the purposes of this paper a broad definition of the
term “privatization” is employed.

Narrowly understood, privatization means the

outright divestiture of state assets.

However, it may also include any other

arrangement where state ownership of assets remains unchanged but decision making
is transferred to a private institution.8 Privatization may go even further to include
the commercialization of public water services. Commercialization occurs when the
state does not transfer control of the provision of water services but runs it as a

6 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Par 2 at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html
7 R Malherbe “Privatisation and the Constitution: Some Exploratory Observations” Tydskrif vir Suid
Afrikaanse Reg 2001(1) 2
8 Privatization manifests different arrangements, see note 1 above at 16-17: (1) Full divestiture in terms of
which ownership is transferred but the utility is operates under supervision of an independent public
regulatory body (2) Service agreement (where the state remains answerable for the functioning and
maintenance of the service, but certain elements of the service are contracted out) (3) Management
contract (the contractor operates and maintains the service but the state supervises the contractor and is
responsible for investment (3) Lease (the plant is rented from the state and the private agency assumes the
operation of the service, reporting requirements are set out in the agreement) (4) Concession, an investment
linked agreement in terms of which the concessionaire takes up general responsibility for operations,
maintenance and investment during the period of the contract. The concessionaire is responsible for tariff
collection and customer management. Ownership of the assets are handed over to the local authority at the
end of the contract (5) Build, Own, Operate and Transfer contracts (BOOT) in terms of which private
operators build the service system and plants, take responsibility for the operation and maintenance but the
facilities transferred to the state at the end of the contract, usually 25 years (6) Community/NGO provision
which involves the handing over of some or all responsibility for water provision to the end user or a nonprofit intermediary.
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business operation by mechanisms such as ring fencing and full cost recovery.

To begin with, one must dispel the notion that profitability and efficiency is an
inevitable consequence of privatization. Whether privatization will transform water
services into an efficient operation depends on a number of factors9 including: the
size and scope of the operation; the financial condition of municipality; the potential
for changing municipal management and operations; the size and financial resources
of the provider; operational efficiencies; the service provider’s experience with
similar water systems and consumption patterns.

Of course, the existence of

competition for the provision of the service also impacts on the provider’s efficiency
levels and overall performance. Let us not forget however that the profitability of
private actors performing public functions will not necessarily translate into a benefit
for the public.

It is important to bear in mind some of the central motivations for and against
privatization.10 Proponents of privatization argue that governments are ill suited to
provide water services in a reliable and cost effective manner. It is said that the
public service lacks creativity and is intrinsically corrupt. In addition, it is claimed
that the cash strapped state is unable to expand and upgrade water services
independently of the private sector. Advocates of privatization argue that the private
sector, with its commercial design and operating principles, must be a key constituent
of water delivery strategies. By contrast, antagonists of privatization suggest that
9 C. Arnold in “Privatization of Public Water Services: The State’s Role in Ensuring Public
Accountability” 32 Pepp. L. Rev 561 2004-2005 at 565, 581
10 Note 1
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private companies are interested solely in ensuring profitable outcomes and are not
interested in advancing the public interest. Private operators levy high rates that are
prohibitive of access by the poor and they disconnect services when consumers are
unable to afford to pay. Private operators also tend to cut corners to reduce costs,
threatening the quality of the water and in turn generating health risks for the public.
In addition, privatization may lead to the complete exclusion of some income poor
population groups altogether. It is also argued that privatization generates corruption
through bribes for contracts or by encouraging competitors to artificially decrease
bids just to get a foot in the door.11

The first part of this paper describes the South African context and the trend to
privatize water services is highlighted. Next, the legislative framework that has been
put in place will briefly be explored. The third section looks at the content of the
constitutional right of access to water, using international human rights law as a
compass.

The fourth part looks at the implementation of the right to water,

considering one of the recently privatized schemes and looking at breaches of the
constitutional right. The fifth part concludes with the thesis that the manner in which
privatization has been implemented has put equitable access to water at risk and it
threatens to exacerbate existing disparities in service provision. Because privatization
is a “continuum of public and private mixes, with varying degrees of involvement and
exposure to risks by the two sectors”12 it is not feasible to argue that all forms of
commercialization or privatization are unconstitutional. The author does propose

11 Note 1
12 Note 1, 15
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however that the legislative philosophy has been flawed at least in two key respects,
by assuming that there is sufficient regulatory capacity and by the absence of any
requirement for independent monitoring. Implementation has been flawed in many
more respects, such as the failure to adopt a pricing strategy that favors the poor,
violations of due process and the failure to provide an adequate quantity of free basic
water to the poor.

PART I: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

The apartheid government created a system of water control based on riparian title
(the holders of which were drawn mainly from the minority white population group)
which gave private land owners extensive rights in relation to water resources.13 In
the so-called homelands (ten administrative areas consisting of no more than 13.5%
of the total land), which served as the dumping ground for blacks who were surplus to
the cheap labor needs of the white community, authority over water resources vested
in the homeland government but implemented through traditional chiefs.14 Enormous
disparities developed under apartheid, for instance, almost 95% of the water used for
irrigation was used by the large-scale farming community, who were almost
exclusively white.15 New legislation passed since the collapse of apartheid has meant
that control over water is characterized by interplay between three formal systems:
apartheid era laws, former homeland laws and post-apartheid legislation.16 Under the

13 S. Liebenberg “The National Water Bill-Breathing Life into the Right to Water” ESR Review Vol.1
No1 (1998) 1
14 Note 3, 195, 200
15 Note 3, 198
16 Note 3, 195-200
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present dispensation, water and sanitation services (limited to potable water supply
systems, domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems) fall within the
competence of local authorities.17

When the African National Congress (ANC) took power in 1994, the state faced a
massive service and infrastructure backlog described a few years later by the Minister
of Local Government in the following terms: “conservatively estimated that the total
cumulative [infrastructure and service] backlog is about R47-53 billion, with an
average annual backlog of R10,6 billion”.18 It was not long before the ANC decided
that the best way of dealing with the infrastructure backlog would be to resort to
private capital. The Water and Sanitation Policy White Paper (1994) announced that
“proposals for the private sector to provide services will be considered where these
may be in the public interest and where this approach is supported by the community
concerned”.19

Privatization of water services was given a boost during 1996 when the
government replaced the Reconstruction and Development Program with the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR). GEAR rejected an expansionary
fiscal strategy which “would only give a short term boost to growth” and instead
focused on reducing the national deficit, encouraging investment, reducing inflation

17 Constitution of South Africa, Schedule 4, Part B
18 White Paper on Municipal Services Partnerships, GG No. 21126 at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/whitepaper/2000/21126.pdf
19 Note 1, 25
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and interest rates.20

In 1997, the government published and adopted the Water Services Policy with a
declared intention “to promote the efficient use of water, the policy will be to charge
users for the full financial costs of providing access to water, including infrastructure
development...”21

During 2000, the ANC announced its plan to introduce free basic municipal
services. This promise took shape when the Minister promulgated regulations during
2001 under the authority of the Water Services Act of 1997.22 The Water Services
Act granted to everyone the right of access to a basic water supply and basic
sanitation, defined as the “standard of water services necessary for the reliable supply
of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, including informal
households, to support life and personal hygiene.” The prescribed standard is “a
minimum quantity of potable water of 25 liters per person per day or 6 kilolitres per
household per month” located within 200 meters of a household and “with
effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more than seven full days
in any year”.23

However, the free basic water policy should not be seen as the panacea for the
water crisis. As discussed later, the quantity of free basic water was inadequate.

20 GEAR Policy at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/policy/growth.html?rebookmark=1#ch2 (last
visited on 21 April 2005)
21 Water Services Policy (1997) at http://www.thewaterpage.com/wp3.htm
22 Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997 at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1997/a108-97.pdf
23 Government Gazette No. 22355 Reg. No. 509 (8 June 2001)
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Furthermore privatization, pricing policies and cost recovery mechanisms limited
access. In any event, several years after the free basic water policy was created there
were still significant problems with the implementation of free basic water.24 These
implementation difficulties were created to some degree by the inability of local
government to independently finance the supply of free basic water, in the absence of
adequate financial support from national government.25

Then, during 2002, the state published its Draft White Paper on Water Services.
In that document, the state warned consumers that the “right to a free basic water
supply is not an absolute right…abuse of the right to free basic water can result in the
restriction and/or disconnection of the water supply, provided fair and equitable
procedures are followed and special arrangements for indigent persons are made”. At
the same time, civil society organizations exposed the increase in water
disconnections, with figures running into the millions, since 1994. Although these
figures were disputed, DWAF conceded that the number of disconnections was high
and a source of concern.26

During 2003, the state made a number of statements which confirmed its
inclination to privatize water services. On 7 April 2003, the Minister confirmed that

24 Joint submission by COSATU & SAMWU on the Draft White Paper on Water Services (2002) at
http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/2003/warserv.htm
25 Section 229(1) of the Constitution entitles municipalities to raise revenue via rates on property and
surcharges on fees and services provided by or on behalf of the municipality as well as any other taxes or
levies permitted by national government. Section 214(2) (d) of the Constitution entitles local government
to an equitable division of the revenue collected nationally which takes into its need to provide basic
services and perform the functions allocated to them.
26 DWAF Media Release, 6/6/03
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Communications/PressReleases/2003/BUDGET%20Press%20Release%20version
%203.doc
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the mere fact that the state did not intend to sell off its public water services
infrastructure to the private sector was no obstacle to involving the private sector in
water service delivery. The Minister stated “The South African government believes
that the private sector has an important role to play in service provision. However,
Government will always retain responsibility for ensuring that there is adequate water
services provision…The decision to use the private sector should be taken by those
concerned, provided that they have adequate capacity and information to make a
sound decision.”27 Later that same year, the Minister of Water Affairs articulated
water policy in the following terms:

“The Constitution and policy of Government do not allow people to be
deprived of basic water supplies. Municipalities must restrict flow to the
free basic water level rather than cut it off completely. The new White
Paper on Water Services will repeat this message loudly and clearly. But
we are also seeking to establish effective, democratic local government
that can sustain services to our people. If those who use more than the free
basic amount do not have to pay, the resulting free-for-all will be
impossible to sustain and services will collapse….we insist that
democratically elected local governments may consider private service
provision although we require them first to consider public alternatives.
We simply demand that whatever arrangement they choose gives priority
to meeting the needs of the poor and to the provision of free basic
services”28

27 R. Kasrils conference statement on 7 April 2003, reported at:
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Communications/PressReleases/2003/SA%20View%20on%20opportunities%20fo
r%20private%20involvement%20in%20Water%20in%20Africa.doc
28 R Kasrils Press Release on 6/8/2003 reported at:
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/communications/articles/kasrils/2003/cutoffs%20article%20website.doc)
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These Ministerial statements meant no more than that privatization in its
narrowest form, viz. transfer of ownership of water facilities and services, was not on
the immediate agenda. Privatization in the form of divestiture of state assets may not
have occurred29 but commercialization and others forms of privatization, such as
public-private partnerships, have been vigorously explored.30 Later that year, the
Minister defended the use of pre-paid meters in response to protestations that pre-paid
water meters constituted a violation of the right of access to water.31 He contended
that pre-paid meters allowed consumers to monitor the amount of water used and
assisted the state to supply the free basic minimum amount of water. He also stated
that, since 1994, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) had provided
infrastructure for the supply of water to approximately 10 million rural dwellers that
previously had no access while a further 6 million individuals had been supplied with
water through public urban and housing programs.

Recent trends toward privatization of water services co-exist uneasily with the
constitutional right of access to water which provides: “27(1) (b) Everyone has the
right to have access to sufficient food and water (2) The state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of each of these rights.” Besides section 27(2), the duty to
realize access to sufficient water is also reflected in section 7(2) of the Constitution
which provides that the state is obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the
29 Note 1 at 28
30 Although only four of 284 municipalities have contracted out management of water, 5 million people
are serviced through these ‘privatized’ systems (at note 1, 37)
31 Letter dated 11 November 2003, DWAF website:
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Communications/PressReleases/Default_dates.asp?year=2003
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rights in the Bill of Rights.32 Before defining the content of the right to sufficient
water, it is necessary to consider whether section 27(1) (b) applies to private actors.

Constitutional obligations may be extended to private actors under the
Constitution, which specifically makes provision for the horizontal application of the
Bill of Rights. Certain duties, such as the prohibition against unfair discrimination,
are explicitly applicable to private actors while the application of other rights must be
considered in light of section 8(2). Section 8(2) provides that the Bill of Rights binds
a natural or a juristic person if it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. This section may be interpreted
in two different ways. The first approach would consider each right and determine
whether it is capable and suitable for extension to private actors while the second
methodology would require a consideration of the textual construction of each right.33
It has been contended that the former interpretation of section 8(2) is the proper
approach because the latter methodology is too formalistic.34 However, it has also
been suggested that the nature of the duty to progressively realize the rights in section
27(1) (b) is too burdensome to impose positive obligations on private actors and those
rights should therefore not be horizontally applied.35 Clearly, section 27 applies
horizontally because it imposes negative duties on all persons to refrain from
impairing the right. The Constitutional Court has affirmed that, at a minimum, there
is a negative duty on the state and all other entities and persons to desist from
32 Section 7(2)
33 Some rights are expressly horizontal in application (e.g. section 9(4) which provides that no person may
unfairly discriminate against anyone) others make no reference to application.
34 D Davis & H Cheadle “Application of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere” 13 S. Afr. J on Hum.
Rts. at 57
35 Id at 60
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impairing entrenched constitutional rights.36

It may also be argued that section 23937 read with section 7(2) of the Constitution,
permits horizontal application of socio-economic rights vis-à-vis private actors when
they exercise a power or function in terms of the Constitution or when they exercise a
public power or perform a public function in terms of any legislation. The broad
language of section 239 suggests that it calls for horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights38 where private actors execute functions allocated to the state under the
Constitution however the fact that horizontal application is specifically addressed in
section 8 seems to indicate the contrary. Nevertheless, if section 239 is relevant, then
the “doctrine of state action”39 would provide a useful guide to its interpretation.40 In
addition, sections 26 and 27 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Discrimination Act of 200041 imposes a duty on all persons, natural and juristic, to
promote equality and refrain from unfair discrimination. Equality, in section 1, is
defined broadly and extends to the full enjoyment of all rights and freedoms under the
Constitution.

Of course, whether section 27(1) (b) applies horizontally or not, the legal

36 Government of RSA v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) at par 34
37 Section 239 relates to “organs or state”, which includes functionaries and institutions performing
functions under the Constitution or which perform public functions in terms of legislation.
38 Ellman S “A Constitutional Confluence: American State Action Law and the Application of South
Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights” 24
39 In the United States, the state action doctrine prescribes that where private actors execute traditionally
public functions then courts may treat them as public actors. The factors that may be relevant are whether a
“private actor is performing a public function; whether the state has compelled or encouraged the action;
and whether the state is intertwined with the private actor.” See note 38 at 65
40 Note 38; See further D Chirwa “Non-State Actors Responsibility for Socio-Economic Rights: The
Nature of their Obligations under the South African Constitution” in ESR Review Vol. 3 No. 3
41 http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/2000/act4.pdf
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framework for privatization schemes must still be consistent with the Constitution,
because the Constitution is the supreme law and all law or conduct inconsistent with
it is invalid.42

PART II: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

Following the entrenchment of GEAR, the state set about creating a legislative
framework for private actors to participate in water services and developing a
regulatory framework for private actors. As will be seen from the provisions of the
various statutes, Parliament is well aware of the risks privatization poses to the
realization of the right to water.

The Water Services Act, passed in 1997, was distinctive in a number of different
ways. It did not just entitle everyone to a free basic water supply and basic sanitation
but it also required all water services institutions, including private suppliers, to take
reasonable measures to realize those entitlements.43

It prohibited limitation or

discontinuation of water services if that would result in individuals being denied
access to basic water services for non-payment provided that those individuals prove,
to the satisfaction of the water services authority, that they are unable to pay. The Act
contemplates the creation of national norms for tariffs and the development of water
services development plans.

Every water services institution, including private

providers, must comply with the prescribed national norms. Regulations passed

42 Section 2 of the Constitution
43 Section 3(2) of the Water Services Act, 1997
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under the Water Services Act44 require contracts between municipalities and with
external service providers to stipulate the method of payment by the municipality to
the service provider. Interestingly, it requires payments to the service provider to
take into account “the requirement for a reasonable rate of return on any investment”.

The National Water Act No. 36 of 199845 represented a significant break from the
previous water management system. The primary objective of the Act, referenced
throughout the text, is to redress the racial and gender inequities of the past.46 The
Water Act, 1956 and its system of riparian rights was discarded in favor of a licensing
system that allows for the reallocation of water from high volume users to poor water
users.47 The National Water Act also recognized the state as the public trustee of all
water resources and it empowered the Minister to ensure that water is protected, used
and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner for the benefit of all persons.48
On the other hand, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are problems with the
National Water Act which adversely impact on the right to water. Firstly, due to a
drafting omission, the Act failed to provide for small scale but market oriented
productive water uses by the poor.49 This is likely to be a temporary problem. It also
granted lawful status to all existing water usage if it was considered legal in the two
years before the promulgation of the Act, thereby entrenching former inequities.50
Lastly, the National Water Act defined basic water needs only in terms of domestic

44 Government Gazette No. 23636, Notice No. 980 (19/07/2002), section 12(b)
45 http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1998/index.html
46 Note 3 at 203
47 Note 3 at 204
48 National Water Act, section 3(1)
49 Note 3 at 206
50 National Water Act, section 33
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usage.51

Legislation facilitating privatization was then developed for the local government
sector. The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000 (the Systems Act)
empowered local municipalities to enter into service delivery agreements with
external service providers and delegate to them responsibility for operational
planning, management and provision of the municipal service.52 The municipality
was also granted authority to assign to the private operator responsibility for customer
management and service fee collection. However, before deciding to use an external
service provider, the Act sets out onerous procedures to be followed and requires
internal service provision to first be assessed.53 In addition, before the appointment
of an external service provider, the Systems Act requires a competitive bidding
process.54

The Systems Act acknowledges that privatization may impact on the
constitutional right of access to water in a number of ways. Most importantly, it
provides that when a municipality enters into an agreement with an external service
provider, the municipality remains responsible to provide the service to the local

51 National Water Act, section 16, read with the title to Part 3
52 Section 1 defined “basic municipal services” as “services necessary to ensure and acceptable and
reasonable quality of life…”. Although it does not expressly include water, it is quite apparent that the
definition covers access to water services.
53 In relation to internal service provision, section 78(1) of the Municipal Systems Act requires certain
factors to be considered such as the direct and indirect costs and benefits associated with the project, the
capacity and resources to provide the service as well as the impact it may have on development. In relation
to external service provision, in addition to the many of the factors already mentioned, there are other
factors to be considered such as the expected effect on the environment and human health and safety.
54 Section 83
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community.55 The Act specifically obliges the municipality to regulate the provider,
monitor and assess the implementation of the service agreement, monitor the
performance of the provider and control the setting or adjustment of tariffs by the
provider.

The municipality must “generally exercise its authority to ensure

uninterrupted service in the best interests of the community”.56

Although the Systems Act requires the municipality to take community views into
consideration before deciding to use an external service provider, it is not legally
constrained by those views. The Act compels the municipality to communicate the
contents of the proposed agreement to the community and to consult with it on the
agreement. Notably, the Systems Act provides that municipalities may, through
service delivery agreements, “assign responsibility to the service provider for
developing and implementing detailed service delivery plans within the framework of
the municipality’s integrated development plan”.57 However, this does not require
the service provider to adopt the entire integrated development plan of the
municipality. The scope of the service provider’s developmental obligations remains
a matter for negotiation and agreement.

PART III: CONTENT OF THE RIGHT

Before exploring the content of the constitutional right of access to sufficient
water, it is necessary to consider whether privatization per se is unconstitutional.

55 Section 81(1)
56 Municipal Systems Act, section 81
57 Municipal Systems Act, section 81(2)(a)
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Several types of constitutional restraints on privatization may exist.
constitution

may prescribe

a

particular

economic

system

that

A national
precludes

privatization58. Secondly, particular constitutional provisions might limit the use of
privatization as a policy option.59 Thirdly, a constitution may envisage a society that
necessitates a strong and interventionist public sector.60

Finally, there could be

procedural hurdles that constrain and inhibit the ability to implement privatization
schemes. This may include the decentralization of power between federal and local
levels or specific procedures which must be first followed before privatization.

It has been suggested that the Constitutional Court implicitly accepted that the
private sector may be involved with the delivery of public services. In Government of
the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and others61 the Court stated that it was
not merely the state that was responsible for the provision of houses.62 However, this
statement must not be taken out of context; the Court was not considering a challenge
to privatization.

A recent study considered whether the Constitution imposes

constitutional restraints on privatization as a policy option.63 The study explores
various constitutional provisions but finds only a remote suggestion of the economic
system contemplated by the constitutional framers through their use, in the preamble,
of the term ‘social justice’. The study concluded that the constitutional text provided
only a tenuous foundation for the proposition that privatization was precluded as a
58 Note 7 at 3
59 C Gillette & P. Stephan III, “Constitutional Limits on Privatization” 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp 481 998,
point out at 500 that in the United States states are sometimes required to provide particular functions but
they note that “this does not confer a monopoly on the state for the production of that service or function”.
60 Note7, 3-4
61 Government of RSA v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC)
62 Par 35
63 Note 7
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policy option.64 It has therefore been claimed that the Constitution takes a non-rigid
approach to economic policy and permits the state to develop and implement its
policy as it deems fit.

Scholars who argue that privatization is not precluded by the constitutional text
place emphasis on the fact that the realization of human rights norms are not premised
on any particular type of economic system.

The Limburg Principles on the

Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, formulated by international experts, suggest that state parties are granted a
“margin of discretion” in selecting the means to implement the rights in the
ICESCR.65 The UN Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (Committee
on ESCR) in its General Comments accepts that the right of access to water may be
implemented by private actors.

In paragraph 8 of General Comment 366 the

Committee on ESCR stated that:

“…the undertaking to take steps ... by all appropriate means including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures neither requires nor
precludes any particular form of government or economic system being
used as the vehicle for the steps in question, provided only that it is
democratic and that all human rights are thereby respected. Thus, in terms
of political and economic systems the Covenant is neutral and its
principles cannot accurately be described as being predicated exclusively
upon the need for, or the desirability of a socialist or a capitalist system…
In this regard, the Committee reaffirms that the rights recognized in the
64 Note 7 at 19
65 UN Document E/CN 4/1987/17 at Par 71
http://www.hrca.org.au/RBABetaVer1_0/archives/Limburg%20Principles.pdf
66 http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument
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Covenant are susceptible of realization within the context of a wide
variety of economic and political systems…Moreover, any deliberately
retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful
consideration and would need to be fully justified…”

It is often claimed that privatization has a “redistributive thrust” that is in
harmony with the rationale for socio-economic rights. Privatization can be a valuable
tool for black economic empowerment and the promotion of popular capitalism
through employee share purchasing schemes.67

It is frequently argued that

privatization facilitates the achievement of socio-economic rights because of its
potential to enhance operational efficiency, economic growth and development.68 Of
course, these arguments are premised on the capacity of private corporations to
generate resources and to distribute those resources equitably thereby eradicating
poverty.69

It may be true that the Constitution does not explicitly prescribe economic policy,
but surely this is not the end of the debate. Privatization creates accountability
difficulties that are hard to reconcile with democratic norms enshrined in the
Constitution.70

Democracy contemplates, at the very least, accountability to the

electorate and compliance with the rule of law.71 Contracting out of a conventionally
public function “creates significant accountability problems because the private
67 D. Chirwa “Privatization of Water in Southern Africa” in Afr Hum Rts L J 2004 (4) 226
68 Id 225
69 McBeth A Privatising Human Rights: What happens to the State’s Human Rights Duties When Services
are Privatised? 5 Melb. J. Int’l Law 134 2004 at 143
70 Section 1 of the Constitution defines the nation as a “sovereign democratic state”.
71 J Freeman “Annual Regulation of Business Focus: Privatization” 52 Admin. L. Rev. 813 (2000) 814,815
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provider is one step further removed from direct accountability to the electorate.”72
Removing social services from the hands of political actors and placing them at
mercy of the market undermines democratic norms and erodes the ability of the
public to lobby their elected representatives in respect of social services.

There are of course other arguments that privatization per se impairs the
realization of the right to water.73 Firstly, the assumption that the private sector is
able to positively influence economic growth and efficiency is unsubstantiated and
inconsistent.74

Even when enhanced economic performance has occurred after

privatization, it is often not possible to identify privatization as the reason for the
improvement.75 It is important to note that economic growth does not automatically
translate into greater access to services for those who cannot afford services.76 It
cannot be denied that profit driven corporations do not exist for the purposes of
achieving substantive equality but are guided by the acquisition of profit. They are
bound above all by their fiduciary duty to generate profit for shareholders.77 The
principal interest in social equity for a corporation is good public relations.78 In light

72 Id at 824; see also J Freeman “The Contracting State” 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev 155 2000-2001 at 198-201
73 Note 67, 226-230
74 D. Stevenson “Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract” 45 Ariz. L. Rev
93 2003. Stevenson argues that civil servants and profit seekers alike seek “rents” or “inefficient payments
for their time, talents or labor”. Civil servants receive rents in the form of “fringe benefits, pleasant
working conditions, congenial associates, undemanding work loads, security against dismissal” while rents
of contractors are often in monetary form. Rents in a corporation, being more difficult to identify than
those of public sector employees, gives the illusion of savings. Stevenson demonstrates how privatized
welfare contracts: (i) based on a pay per case fee to the private entity results in unnecessary reconsideration
of the same file (ii) based on flat fee arrangements result in cursory reviews and dumping of files (iii) with
incentives for private operators to reduce costs result in welfare recipients being driven away.
75 Note 67, 227
76 Id
77 Note 74, Stevenson refers to an argument that shareholder primacy may be diminished by creating a
fiduciary duty between the corporations and the community they serve.
78 Note 9 at 597
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of the limited scope of these fiduciary duties, it is arguable that the state should
acquire shareholder interest in the private operator to ensure its accountability. To
presage a further argument it is plausible that privatization will be unconstitutional in
the absence of economic incentives to progressively realize the right to water.79
However, purely for the purposes of further analysis, it will be assumed that
privatization is not per se unconstitutional.

Although the Constitution itself provides no explicit guide as to how to
conceptualize the term “access” to “sufficient” water in section 27(1) (b), the
Constitution permits reference to international law for the purpose of interpreting the
Bill of Rights.80 International human rights treaties do not readily recognize the right
of access to water, aside from a few noticeable exceptions.81 The ICESCR itself only
recognizes the right to water indirectly by recognition of the rights to food and an
adequate standard of living. The Committee on ESCR, interpreting the articles 11
(the right to adequate food) and article 12 (the right to an adequate standard of living,
including adequate food, clothing and housing) affirmed in General Comment No. 15
of 2002 (hereafter GC15) that this includes the right of access to a supply of safe and
adequate water.82 Although South Africa signed the ICESCR, it has not yet ratified
the treaty.

Nonetheless GC 15 provides important interpretive guidance on the

content of the right of access to water and the duty of the state to take reasonable and

79 Note 69, 148-153
80 Section 39(2)
81 The Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) recognizes the right of rural
women to a water supply and the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes the right of children to
clean drinking water.
82 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment (2002) No. 15 (GC15)
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94?Opendocument
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other legislative measures with its available resources to progressively realize the
right.

Accessibility and Sufficiency of Water

Accessibility of water, according to the Committee on ESCR entails fours
elements. Firstly, water must be physically accessible and be within safe physical
reach of each household, educational institution and workplace. Secondly, water
must be economically accessible and be provided at rates that are affordable to all.
Thirdly, access to water must be provided on a non-discriminatory basis. Fourthly,
provision must be made for sharing of information about water issues.

Sufficient water, according to the Committee on ESCR, requires that the quantity
of water be adequate and safe for personal and domestic uses. What is sufficient must
be determined by reference to what is necessary to “prevent death from dehydration,
reduce the risk of water related disease and provide for consumption, cooking,
personal and domestic hygienic requirements”.83 The adequacy of the quantity of
water necessary for any individual will vary according to the different circumstances
but should be consistent with the guidelines issued by the World Health
Organization.84 This aspect is discussed in greater detail later. It should be noted
however that the Committee on ESCR, by defining a sufficient quantity of water only
by reference to personal and domestic usage (although agricultural usage may be

83 GC 15 par 2
84 GC 15 par 12(a)
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more important for rural dwellers) exhibited a western or urban bias.85

Duty to respect, promote and fulfil the right

As mentioned earlier, the state is obliged to respect, promote and fulfil the right of
access to sufficient water. The Committee on ESCR states that the obligation to
respect the right obliges the state to desist from, directly or indirectly, obstructing the
enjoyment of the right of access to water. The Committee suggests that states are
required to protect the right by preventing third parties, including corporations, from
interfering with the right.86 The Committee has declared that “where water services
…are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties must prevent them from
compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable
water.”87

The obligation to fulfil requires the state to facilitate, promote and provide the
right to adequate water. Facilitation of the right implies that the state must take
positive steps to help individuals and communities to enjoy the right and it must
provide adequate water when individuals or groups are unable, for reasons beyond
their control, to realize the right by themselves.

The state is obligated to take

whatever measures are necessary to realize the right. This includes the use of suitable
low-cost techniques and technologies, appropriate pricing policies and income
supplements. Pricing of water services must be “based on the principle of equity,

85 Note 2 at 56B-11
86 GC 15 par 23
87 GC 15 par 24
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ensuring that the services whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for
all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer households
should not be disproportionately burdened with water expenses as compared to richer
households.”88

Reasonable Privatization Program

Section 27 obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures to
achieve the right to adequate water. Accordingly, if the state decides to transfer
responsibility for the provision of water services to the private sector it must do so
under a reasonable privatization scheme. The reasonableness standard, in the context
of section 26 and 27, was addressed by the Constitutional Court in Government of the
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and others,89 Soobramoney v Minister of
Health, Kwa-Zulu Natal,90 Minister of Health v Treatment Act Campaign91and Rail
Commuters Action Group v Transnet.92

In those cases, the Court rejected the approach taken by the Committee on ESCR
that every socio-economic right has a minimum core which is immediately
enforceable because the Constitution did not expect what was not affordable.

The

real question was therefore whether the state had taken reasonable legislative and
other measures to realize the right and the achievement of the minimum core are an

88 GC 15 para 27
89 2001(1) SA 46 (CC)
90 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)
91 2002(5) SA 721 (CC)
92 Case No: CCT56/03 (at http://concourt.law.wits.ac.za/courtrecords.php?case_id=12840)

26
indication of whether the legislative and other policies are reasonable. Although this
denies individuals an immediate claim to relief from the state, the Court will apply
high level of scrutiny in relation to what constitutes reasonable legislative and other
measures. The Court has demonstrated its willingness to assess reasonableness in the
light of principles such as comprehensiveness, transparency, effective implementation
and short term provision for those in urgent need. In Grootboom the Court also stated
that a reasonable program must “clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the
different spheres of government and ensure that appropriate financial and human
resources are available”.93 No less important is the Court’s statement in the Rail
Commuters case where it evaluated reasonableness in the context of the nature of the
duty, the social and economic context in which it arises, the extent of the threat to
fundamental rights and a consideration of the intensity of the harm that may result.

Affordability of Water Services

Reasonableness must take affordability into account, a fundamentally important
issue because access is ordinarily determined by reference to an individual’s ability to
pay for water services. In a society in which 65% of the population is income poor,
the state may be obliged to subsidize the cost of water services for the poor. The
pricing policy must not be discriminatory and must not exclude those in desperate
need. This has been recognized in the present legislative framework in a number of
different ways: provision of free basic water, the potential for the establishment of
water tariffs that take into account the socio-economic status of users and the
93 Par 39
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retention of public control over tariffs where provision of services is privatized.94
The implementation of these legislative mandates will be discussed separately.

Duty to Monitor and Regulate

A reasonable framework for privatization schemes must make provision for
independent monitoring of private operators because monitoring by the private
operator will be guided by self-interest and is therefore likely to result in distortion.
Monitoring by the state would be equally inappropriate. Contracting out of services
would not have occurred in the first place had the state not been inclined to privatize
them.

Furthermore, states might shield service providers to avoid political

embarrassment or they might do so to avoid having to provide the service itself. The
Committee on ESCR specifically recommends that monitoring of private service
providers be independent.95

Independent monitoring is indispensable for

transparency and accountability. It is also vital to mediate the quality and quantity of
services as well as the price.96 The independent monitoring agency should have the
authority and capacity to assess public opinion on service provision, receive and
appraise complaints, recommend solutions to the local municipality or the service
provider and scrutinize the corrective action.

Regulations97 under the Water Services Act require only that the service contract

94 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, section 74 read with section 81(3)
95 GC 15 at par 24
96 P. Bond, D. McDonald & G. Ruiters “Water Privatisation in Southern Africa: The State of the Debate”
ESR Review Vol. 4 No. 4 (2003) at 4
97 Government Gazette 23636 Reg. No 980 (19 July 2002)

28
make provision for the manner in which the water services authority will monitor the
performance of the external service provider. There is no mandatory requirement that
there be independent monitoring.

It is therefore plausible that the absence of

provision for independent monitoring could form the foundation of a constitutional
challenge to privatization schemes.

Given the extremely high rate of illiteracy in South Africa and the technical
expertise that would be required to assess compliance with the water services
contract, it is submitted that monitoring not be delegated to community boards. The
high rate of poverty also suggests that voluntary citizen boards98 which rely on
membership fees to employ organizers, lawyers, lobbyists, economists and others
staff are inappropriate. It is recommended that the monitoring function be performed
by an independent municipal services ombudsman with appropriate public funding,
technical expertise and investigative powers, an arrangement which has already been
mooted in the White Paper on Municipal Services Partnerships.99

It is hard to envisage an unregulated but reasonable privatization program. The
Committee on ESCR suggests that, where water services are privately operated, states
are obliged to establish an effective regulatory system which must include
independent monitoring, genuine public participation and imposition of penalties for
non-compliance. Regulation is crucial to ensure the appropriate quality, accessibility
and sufficiency of water. It is also essential to ensure the progressive realization of
98 S Flynn & D. Chirwa “Constitutional Implications of Commercializing Water in South Africa” in Age of
Commodity (note 1) 65
99 Note 18 at par 6
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the right of access to water. These obligations to regulate arise simply because
constitutional duties cannot be delegated by the state to the private sector. There is a
compelling argument that the state remains liable for regulatory failure, regardless of
the form of legislation or contract, such liability arising from its failure to exercise
due diligence in its regulation of the private service provider.100

Of course, the state must devote sufficient financial and human resources to
effectively regulate the private service operator. In addition, it is suggested that the
state be statutorily obliged to assess its regulatory capacity before the actual decision
to contract out services is taken.

The evaluation should be comprehensive and

involve community participation as well as independent expertise. Regrettably, the
Systems Act presently makes no provision for a prior evaluation of the regulatory
framework or the regulatory capacity of the state.

It is submitted that effective regulation should make provision for the state to
impose statutory penalties on private providers in the event of their non-compliance
with governing legislation or the service contract itself. It is unreasonable for the
state to rely on contractual remedies to ensure protection of the lives and health of the
public. At present, there is no provision for statutory penalties to be imposed by the
state.

100 D. Mullan & A. Ceddia “Impact on Public Law of Privatization, DeRegulation, Outsourcing, and
Downsizing: A Canadian Perspective” 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud 199 2003 at 224, 225, 235, 236; See
further note 69 at 149
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Redress for the Public from Private Operators

On 13 August 2003, the UN Economic and Social Council adopted the Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights.101 The Norms clarified that business enterprises may
be the bearers of human rights obligations. They recognized the duty of transnational
corporations to respect national sovereignty, ensure non-discriminatory conduct and
contain duties in relation to the environment and labor.

It must be noted however that the Norms limit the obligations of transnational
corporations to promote, fulfill and respect human rights, in international and national
law, to the “respective spheres of activity and influence” of corporations.102

In

relation to consumers, the Norms provide that:

“Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall act in
accordance with fair business, marketing and advertising practices and …
ensure the safety and quality of the goods and services they provide,
including observance of the precautionary principle. Nor shall they
produce, distribute, market, or advertise harmful or potentially harmful
products for use by consumers.”

The Norms also require businesses to provide adequate reparation to those who

101 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev. 2 at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?Opendocument
102 See Part A: General Obligations
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are adversely affected by their activities. The Norms may yet play a significant role
in ensuring responsibility, where provision of basic services has been privatized.103

Naturally, the common law principles of tort are applicable to private operators if
they negligently or intentionally cause harm to the public. This may result, for
example, from the supply of a poor quality of water which generates health risks.
Such action is, by its very nature, limited to redressing the harm already caused to the
public. Whether private operators will be responsible to the public on any other basis
will depend on the horizontal application of section 27(1) of the Constitution and on
the nature of the legislative for contractual framework of the privatization scheme.

Section 13 of the Regulation 980 published under the Water Services Act requires
external service providers to prepare and publish a consumer charter, in consultation
with the public, which sets out consumers’ rights to redress. However, consumer
charters are unlikely to take the form of contract, and will therefore not generate
contractual remedies for the public. Contracts create binding obligations between the
parties to the contract and when contracts confer benefits upon third parties those
benefits are enforceable only upon the acceptance of the benefit by the third
parties.104 There are therefore sound policy arguments to create a statutory right of
action for the public so that they are effectively able to enforce the water services
contract themselves.

Although the creation of a statutory right of redress against the private operator is
103 T Sihaka “Privatisation of basic services, democracy and human rights” ESR Review Vol. 4 No. 4, 4
104 This common law contract, is known in South Africa, as stipulatio alteri.
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necessary, statutory rights for the public (who may unable to understand or enforce
their rights) are no substitute for a strong regulatory framework.105

Period of the Contract

The period of the contract, for the implementation of the privatization scheme,
should be short. This is necessary to allow for competitive efficiency, a key rationale
for the contract. Moreover, short term contracts permit the state to cancel or renew
the contract in response to critiques by the independent monitoring agency or the
public. The length of the contract is inversely proportionate to the degree of public
control over the service provider. It is therefore conceivable that lengthy contracts,
such as 30-year concessions, which are currently permissible,106 may be subjected to
legal challenge on the basis that they violate democratic norms.107 Shorter contracts
“foster competition and accountability because private service providers know their
contract will expire soon”.108

Progressive Realization of the Right

The state bears a duty to progressively realize the right of access to sufficient
water subject to its available resources, it must take steps to make certain that social
and economic rights are “made accessible not only to a large number of people but to

105 Note 100, 240-243
106 Contracts between local authorities and private water services providers may not exceed 30 years (see
section 9 of Regulation 980 GG No. 23636 of 19 July 2002)
107 Naturally the counter argument will be that shorter contracts will bring lower capital investments.
108 Note 74 at 129
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a wider range of people as time progresses”.109 A private water service provider
cannot be relied upon by itself to progressively extend access to the poor. Indigent
communities do not enlarge the paying customer base of the private provider are
therefore likely to be neglected.

Accordingly, the state is obliged to provide

economic incentives for the private operator to extend its service and progressively
realize the right of access to water.110 In the absence of such incentives or a state
subsidy111 the provision of parallel services by the public sector may become
unavoidable. Parallel service provision has potential drawbacks. It might inhibit
cross-subsidization of services and it could also result in discriminatory service
provision, where the rich gain access to efficient privatized services and the poor have
access only to lower quality public services.112

Article 2(1) of the ICESCR requires state parties to take all necessary steps to the
maximum of its available resources to achieve the right. In order for a state party to
be able to attribute its failure to meet its minimum core obligations to a lack of
available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all
resources at its disposition to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum
obligations.

However, section 27(2) of the Constitution does not refer to the

maximum of available resources but talks only of “available resources”. What does
this mean in the context of privatization? Firstly, the nature of resources should be

109 Grootboom, note 89, at par 45
110 Note 69 at 148
111 Chirwa, note 67, argues that the removal of state subsidies may constitute a violation of the right to
adequate water.
112 Note 103 at 3
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defined. Scholars113 argue that resources include human resources, technological
resources, information resources as well as material and financial resources.114

The formulation of the constitutional right appears to relate only to resources of
the state. Indeed, public expenditure was typically conceptualized as the sole major
resource which could be tapped to realize human rights.115

It is now generally

accepted that available resources are not limited to the resources of the state but
includes private resources as well as international resources.116

The Limburg

Principles define available resources as those “within a state and those available from
the international community through international co-operation and assistance.”117
Although the typical private service contract envisages the payment of a service fee to
the private provider and contemplates the cost of monitoring and regulation, the state
may seek to reduce its budgetary allocation and rely on private resources for the
expansion of services. We must therefore ask whether such a reduction of spending
is vulnerable to constitutional challenge.

In Soobramoney it was argued that section 27(1) (a)118 read with section 27(2) of
the Constitution, entitled Soobramoney to expensive but potentially life saving
dialysis treatment at a state hospital.

It was common cause that there were

113 S. Leckie “Another Step Towards Indivisibility : Identifying Key Features of Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights” 20 Hum. Rts Q. 107 (1998); C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional
Priorities” (2000) 16 SA J. on Hum Rts 206 at 252-254; D Moellendorf “Reasoning about Resources:
Soobramoney & the Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims” (1998) 14 SA J. on Hum Rts 330-332; P De
Vos “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?” 13 S. Afr J. on Hum Rts 988 (1997) 97, 98
114 R. Robertson “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the ‘Maximum Available
Resources’ Realizing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in 16 Hum Rts Q 694 (1994) 694-702
115 S Leckie, note 113 supra at 107
116 R. Robertson, note 114 supra at 698-699
117 Limburg Principles par 24-26.
118 This section entitles everyone to basic health care services subject to the state’s available resources
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insufficient funds in the existing budgetary allocation to treat him, together with
others who were similarly placed. The Court would not entertain the argument that
additional funds must be redirected from elsewhere in the national budget and
focused on the principled employment of the existing budgetary allocation.119 This
narrow approach has justifiably been critiqued. There is no persuasive reason why
available resources should be interpreted in this restrictive manner given that revenue
may be generated through other means such as loans or progressive taxation.120
Regrettably, it is unlikely the courts will accept that a reduction of public spending on
water services (in anticipation of funding by the private sector) is an impairment of
the right of access to water.

PART IV: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO WATER

To place the constitutional right of access to sufficient water in its proper context,
it is appropriate to consider at least one concrete example. The example selected is
one of the largest concession agreements of its kind in the country.

Biwater Concession

The post-apartheid demarcation of Nelspruit had increased the population under
the Nelspruit local authority from 24 000 to 230 000.121

Many of the newly

integrated areas were populated by indigent black communities that had been severely
119 C Scott & P Alston Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities (2000) 16 SA J. on Hum Rts 206 at 239
120 M. Pieterse “Beyond the Welfare State” Stellenbosch Law Review 2003 (1) 13
121 L. Smith, A Gillett, S Mottiar & F. White “Public Money, Private Failure: Testing the Limits of Market
Based Solutions for Water Delivery in Nelspruit” in Age of Commodity (note 1 above) at 131

36
neglected by the apartheid government and infrastructure in these areas was therefore
in a pitiful state. The Nelspruit local authority faced declining revenue shares from
national government and an increase in demand for services. In 1999, in desperation,
the local authority concluded an agreement with a multi-national company, Biwater,
to provide water and sanitation services and to collect tariffs.122 These services would
be provided through the Greater Nelspruit Utility Company (GNUC), a partnership
that was created between Biwater and a black economic empowerment consortium,
Sivukile Investments. The agreed period of the concession, which assumed the form
of a “build, own, operate and transfer” contract, was 30 years.123 The extreme length
of the contract was motivated by the large capital investment expected of the private
operator.124 The local authority assumed that its retention of the power to veto tariff
increases by the GNUC would grant it sufficient power to protect the public.

There were three principal motivations for entering into the concession; firstly,
there were great expectations for increased capital in infrastructural investment,125
then there was the assumption that the concession would inject greater operational
efficiency and finally there was a belief that the GNUC would demonstrate greater
122 It is worthwhile to note the comments of the Biwater chairperson, A White: “BOOT contracts are not
good for the client,…They are, however, superb for the contractor. The contractor gets four sources of
profit: construction, financial engineering, equity dividend and management contract." White stated that
contractors must ensure that (a) there is a guarantee of payment by the state (b) protection against inflation,
devaluation and foreign exchange fluctuation (c) guaranteed return on investment (d) automatic tariff
increase formula see http://altavoz.nodo50.org/biwater2.html#ENT6 (last visited April 17 2006)
123 Note 121 at 130
124 Note 121 at 135
125 The Department of Local Government reported that “it would cost approximately R350 million to
upgrade existing services in the town to an acceptable level and to provide new and reliable services
….With an actual annual budget of R20 million, the council was unable to provide the necessary services
as well as to ensure that other services are maintained to a satisfactory level. ….more than 50% of the
population living in the greater Nelspruit area do not receive basic water or sanitation services.
(http://www.dplg.gov.za/Documents/Publications/linkingled/linkingledcasestudies/nelspruit/nelspruitnewap
proach.htm)
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effectiveness in tackling the politically charged issue of non-payment.126

During the first few years, the concession recorded significant capital investment
in infrastructure127 and a large increase in the number of new connections.128
However, these successes have been eclipsed by the problems. The local authority
lacked the capacity or will to effectively monitor the provider. It neglected the
Compliance Monitoring Unit that had been created and monitoring virtually collapsed
for a significant period.129 Furthermore, the private operator failed to tackle the
problem of non-payment of water bills, as expected. Non-payment continued for
several reasons. Firstly, there were considerable protests and grievances relating to
the quality of the service, particularly the unreasonably high water bills and the
introduction of strict debt recovery measures. Payment of water bills was of course
also hindered by unemployment and high levels of poverty.130 Tension flared up
because of rate increases, the exact amount of which is unclear.131 The increases had
been introduced in response to the national free basic water policy. The tensions have
resulted in the operations of GNUC being hindered by the residents. As at January
2002, the GNUC was 17 million rand in debt.132 Non-payment has led to a decline in

126 Smith, Gillet, Mottiar & White Public Money, Private Failure note 121 supra at 134-140
127 Ironically, the vast majority of the funds came from the public purse. Ibid
128 Ibid
129 Ibid
130 Ibid
131 The exact amount of the rate increases is unclear. There have been vastly different accounts of the
increases. Allegations were initially made that the rates increased by as much as 400%, although it now
seems that they increased by 10% in 2000 and 2001. The confusion appears to have arisen from the
inclusion of arrears on the water bills. See Mail and Guardian : Water Privatisation a Total Debacle by G.
Daniels at http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=155825&area=%2farchives_online_edition%2f
(last visited 25 April 2006)
132 Ibid
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investor confidence and a suspension of capital investment.133 GNUC now focuses
its attention on the functioning and maintenance of existing infrastructure and has no
plans to invest further until the business turns around.134 The progressive realization
of the right of access to water has been stalled by the suspension of investment.

Breaches of the Right

Privatization and the corporatization of water services have generated a number of
different violations of the constitutional right of access to sufficient water. Some of
these are discussed below.

Firstly, many water service providers are reported to have coerced consumers into
using trickle valves, prepaid meters and other limitation devices. These devices have
the effect of disconnecting consumers when they can no longer afford services,
preventing the continuous supply of water for personal and domestic uses. The
devices affect the accessibility of water, which according to the Committee on ESCR,
should be both sufficient and continuous for personal and domestic uses.135
Significantly, trickle valves have been outlawed in the United Kingdom.136

Service disconnections constitute impermissible limitations on the constitutional

133 Ibid
134 Ibid
135 According to the Committee on ESCR availability requires a water supply that is sufficient and
continuous for personal and domestic uses (GC 15 at par 12(a))
136 The United Kingdom Water Services Act (1999)
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right of access to sufficient water137 because they limit the continuous supply of water
when there are less restrictive means to achieve the objective, such as debt
recovery.138 In the main, the increase in the number of disconnections has resulted
from the vigorous application of full cost recovery measures by both public and
private suppliers. It should be noted that disconnections are easier to implement
when supply of services are privatized because private operators are less susceptible
than government to pressure from the public.

Disconnections or limitations of water services without due process are
unconstitutional. The Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to administrative
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.139

It is arguable that

disconnections or limitations of water services, whether by a public or a private
service provider, constitutes administrative action for the purposes of the Constitution
and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000.140 These due process
protections are echoed in Water Services Act141 which provides for fair and equitable
procedures before any limitation or disconnection of services and which requires
reasonable notice of intention to limit or discontinue water services. Subject to
certain exceptions, the Water Services Act also provides for an opportunity to make

137 Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in
terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all the relevant
factors, including (a) the nature of the right (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation (c) the
nature and extent of the limitation (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose (e) the less
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
138 Note 67 at 68
139 Section 33 of the RSA Constitution
140 Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act requires administrative action that materially
affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person to give adequate notice of the proposed action,
the right to request written reasons and a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to make representations.
141 Water Services Act section 4(3)
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representations before any discontinuation or limitation of water supply. Use of
devices to limit water supply violate due process norms because they limited existing
access to water without the opportunity to make prior representations.

The aforementioned due process norms were considered by the High Court in
Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council.142 The
Court found that the act of disconnecting an existing water supply by the Council was
prima facie in breach of the constitutional right of access to water and placed the onus
on the Council to justify the breach. The Court expressed doubt that a standard
notice, which did not advise consumers of the right to make representations complied
with due process norms in section 4(3) of the Water Services Act. Although not
currently required, it may well be that due process requires that the person whose
rights are to be affected to be personally informed of the impending action.143

The limitation of free basic water to 25 liters per person per day (or 6 kiloliters
per household per month) denies some the right of access to water because it fails to
take into account the fact that many townships have multiple households on a single
site144 and it is premised on an incorrect assumption that there are 8 persons per
household.145 Indeed, there appears to be sufficient evidence indicating that 25 liters
per person per day is inadequate to provide for basic personal and food hygiene

142 [2002] JOL 9513 (W)
143 Note 1 at 69
144 Note 24
145 Id
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needs.146 Although the World Health Organization has not clearly articulated its
position on the basic minimum supply of water necessary for every person, UNESCO
declared that every person requires between 20 and 50 liters of safe per day for their
basic needs.147 However, the fact that the Constitutional Court has eschewed the
minimum core approach may mean that the quantity of the free basic water supply is
beyond challenge.

Access has also been limited by pricing policies. Although the free water policy
has alleviated the problem somewhat, it has been inconsistently implemented148 and
the basic minimum supply is insufficient for basic needs. Furthermore, because water
charges rise steeply after the first free block of water this acts as a constraint on
access by the poor whose access is inevitably limited to the free basic amount.149 The
trend toward implementation of full cost recovery (which includes the initial cost of
the infrastructure, maintenance and service costs) unfairly impacts on the poor
because of higher infrastructure costs for areas disadvantaged by apartheid.150

The use of full cost recovery mechanisms in respect of indigent communities is
suspect. In the first instance, the Constitution permits the introduction of water
related reform measures to redress the results of past racial discrimination.

146 A Kok in “Privatisation and the Right of Access to Water” in Privatisation and Human Rights in the
Age of Globalization by K de Feyter & F Gomez (Eds) (2005) notes, at page 273, that the final version of
Comment 15 (issued by the Committee on ESCR) suggests that between 20 and 50 liters is adequate for
personal and hygienic purposes, 20 liters being the absolute minimum for states with resource constraints.
147 http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/facts_figures/basic_needs.shtml
148 In some areas of South Africa, free basic water is supplied only where there is formal infrastructure
and in other areas free basic water is only supplied after a payment of costly connection fees (Note 98 at
72).
149 Id
150 Note 98 at 65
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Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has already rejected arguments that differential
pricing policies necessarily constitute unfair discrimination. The Constitutional Court
has already endorsed the political branches social transformation efforts.151 In City
Council of Pretoria v Walker152 the Court rejected a challenge by residents of a
formerly white residential area who argued that the application of consumption based
tariffs for their area and a lower flat rate in formerly black townships constituted
unfair discrimination. The Constitutional Court found that the temporary measures
were rationally connected to the legitimate purpose of achieving parity in municipal
service provision.153 Although the statutory framework permits the state to adopt
pricing strategies that would favor the poor, the potential of these mechanisms has
remained unexplored.154

PART V: CONCLUSION

The South African state has clearly demonstrated its preference for private sector
involvement in water service delivery. This has been demonstrated by its macroeconomic perspective as well as by the legislative framework it has put in place since
1994.

The state is fully aware that water services cannot simply be left to the whims of
151 Section 25(8) of the RSA Constitution
152 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC)
153 T. Roux “Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African
Constitutional Court” in Democratization and the Judiciary at 93
154 Provisions of the Water Services Act have not been implemented include those that empower the
Minister to prescribe national standards relating to water services and to differentiate between users and
areas on the basis of socio-economic factors (the standards must take into account the need for everyone to
have a reasonable quality of life and the need for everyone to have equitable access to water services).
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market forces and that “the character of the state’s human rights obligations in
relation to social service provision cannot be transferred entirely from the state to the
private operator, even where the service provision itself is transferred, nor can those
obligations be duplicated in their entirety”.155 Despite this awareness, there are a
number of flaws in the legislative framework as well as in the implementation of
private sector involvement in water service delivery. There has been an unwarranted
assumption that sufficient regulatory capacity exists to regulate private actors.
Moreover, absolutely no provision has been made for independent monitoring of
private providers. Implementation has been scarred by the use of full cost recovery
mechanisms and the absence of a pricing strategy that favors access by the poor. This
has had a disproportionate impact on the poor. Access by the poor has also been
limited by violations of due process norms and the inadequate quantity of free basic
water. Finally, the state has endorsed the use of lengthy concession contracts which
arguably violate constitutionally entrenched democratic norms.

Privatization does not relieve the state of its constitutional duties, if anything,
these obligations become more onerous. The state is required, among other things, to
ensure that the enabling legislation and policy framework is reasonable. The state
must develop a strong regulatory framework and build its capacity to regulate the
private provider. The state must choose an appropriate form of privatization and
make certain that the contractual terms are reasonable.

Finally, the state must

subsidize access by the poor and it may be obliged to provide incentives for the
expansion of services to them. In addition, the state may be constitutionally obliged
155 Note 69 at 149
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to actually provide parallel services to the poor.

The realistic costs of due process rights,156 monitoring157 and regulation, which
costs are inescapable, must be properly considered before privatization is embarked
on. All things considered, it is not hard to understand why it has been said that the
“profit seeking nature of private corporations may be inherently irreconcilable with
the goals and implementation requirements of social service programs.”158

156 Note 74 at 103, 123
157 Monitoring costs may be substantial, they must be estimated and added into the equation (see
Featherstun D et al “State and Local Privatisation” 30 Pub. Cont. L. J. 644 2000-2001 at 649)
158 Note 74 at 111

